Ukrain/Russia Ceasefire Agreements
Timeline (2021–2025)
This timeline highlights all notable ceasefire agreements (formal or informal) between Ukraine and Russia from 2021 through early 2025. Each entry includes the date and context, parties involved, allegations of violations, conflicting claims by each side (and any neutral observers), and an evidence-based assessment of what likely occurred. Sources from official statements, international monitors, and independent reports are provided for each ceasefire.
December 22, 2021 – Reaffirmation of Donbas Ceasefire
Date & Context: In late 2021, with clashes escalating in eastern Ukraine, the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE) met and agreed to restore a “full and comprehensive” ceasefire in the Donbas conflict zone (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters). This was essentially a recommitment to the July 2020 ceasefire measures, aiming to halt hostilities between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatists.
Parties Involved: Representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE (mediator) brokered the deal, with indirect involvement of the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist authorities as part of the Contact Group (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters) (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters).
Alleged Breach: The truce initially reduced violence for several weeks, but by January 2022 ceasefire violations resurged. Both Ukraine and the separatist side accused each other of opening fire in violation of the agreement (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters). There was no singular incident that definitively broke the ceasefire; rather, a gradual erosion occurred.
Conflicting Claims: Ukrainian officials blamed “provocations” by Russian-backed forces for breaking the calm, while Moscow and separatist leaders claimed Ukrainian troops were the ones shooting first (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters). OSCE monitoring reports documented a sharp increase in ceasefire violations in December 2021 (about five times more daily violations than a year prior) (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters), without assigning blame to one side. This indicated the ceasefire was already faltering by late 2021 despite the renewed pledge.
Likely Scenario: Based on OSCE observations, the December 2021 recommitment only temporarily lowered the violence. Within weeks, the situation “remained volatile,” (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters) and by early 2022 violations were back to high levels. It’s likely that both sides engaged in sporadic firing, undermining the truce. The lack of trust and absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, amid Russia’s troop buildup on Ukraine’s borders, meant this ceasefire quickly unraveled. Independent data showed ceasefire breaches doubled in early 2022 compared to early 2021 (With Events Evolving Rapidly in Ukraine, Political Affairs Chief Calls for Diplomacy, Maximum Restraint, as Security Council Evaluates Minsk Accords | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases), reflecting a collapse of this short-lived calm.
March 5–6, 2022 – Failed Humanitarian Ceasefires in Mariupol
Date & Context: Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion on Feb 24, 2022, Ukraine and Russia attempted limited humanitarian ceasefires to evacuate civilians. On March 5, 2022, Russia announced a ceasefire around the besieged cities of Mariupol and Volnovakha to allow evacuation corridors (Putin likens Western sanctions to war as Russian assault traps Ukrainian civilians | Reuters). Ukrainian authorities agreed to the plan, aiming to evacuate thousands of civilians from Mariupol, which was encircled and under heavy bombardment. A second attempt was made on March 6 after the first failed.
Parties Involved: The ceasefire arrangements were coordinated by Ukrainian local officials (Mariupol city authorities), the Ukrainian military, and the Russian military. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was involved as a neutral body to facilitate the corridor (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia).
Alleged Breach: Both March 5 and 6 ceasefires collapsed within hours, halting evacuation efforts. Ukrainian officials on the ground reported that Russian forces violated the ceasefire almost immediately by resuming shelling along the designated escape route (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia) (Fighting traps residents in Mariupol; Putin calls on Ukraine to surrender | Reuters). As a result, terrified civilians had to turn back, and the planned convoys could not safely proceed.
Conflicting Claims: Each side traded blame for these failures. Ukrainian authorities (and witnesses) accused Russian troops of continuing to shell Mariupol during the agreed ceasefire window, calling the evacuation route attack a clear breach (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia). Russia, in turn, denied wrongdoing and claimed Ukrainian forces sabotaged the corridor, alleging that Ukrainian units did not fully halt fire or that they blocked civilians from heading toward Russian-controlled territory (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia). The ICRC, acting as a neutral monitor, confirmed the ceasefires had failed and described “devastating scenes” in Mariupol, but did not assign blame; it noted that agreements were only made “in principle” and lacked precise coordination on routes and timing (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia). Western officials openly sided with Ukraine’s account, with the UK accusing Moscow of using the Mariupol ceasefire offer as a cynical ploy to regroup its forces (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia).
Likely Scenario: Evidence strongly suggests that Russian forces did not fully hold their fire, making the humanitarian corridors unusable. Videos and accounts described continued Russian shelling in Mariupol even during the supposed truce (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia). It’s plausible that miscommunication or intent by local commanders led to these breaches. Given the intensity of the siege and Russia’s strategic interest in pressing the attack, the ceasefire was likely treated as a brief propaganda gesture rather than a commitment. In practice, no effective pause occurred – civilians remained trapped as fighting raged, demonstrating the extreme difficulty of enforcing even short ceasefires in active combat zones (Fighting traps residents in Mariupol; Putin calls on Ukraine to surrender | Reuters).
March 8, 2022 – Successful Evacuation Ceasefire in Sumy
Date & Context: By early March 2022, some humanitarian ceasefires began to succeed outside of Mariupol. On March 8, 2022, Ukraine and Russia implemented a temporary ceasefire in the northeastern city of Sumy to allow civilians to flee. Sumy had been under Russian bombardment, and a corridor was negotiated after midnight on March 8 following international pressure and earlier failed corridor attempts elsewhere (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters). This became the first organized evacuation that worked since the invasion began.
Parties Involved: Ukrainian officials (Sumy regional authorities) coordinated with the Russian military to establish a safe route from Sumy to Poltava (a city in government-controlled central Ukraine). The agreement was likely brokered with help from the ICRC or other intermediaries, and involved commitments from both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side to hold fire along that route.
Alleged Breach: In this case, the ceasefire largely held in Sumy. A pause in fighting from the morning of March 8 allowed evacuation convoys to operate. Sumy’s governor confirmed that the “temporary ceasefire had held long enough” for multiple convoys of buses and cars to depart the city safely (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters). No major violations by either side were reported during the agreed window in Sumy, unlike in other regions that same day.
Conflicting Claims: Notably, there were minimal conflicting claims about Sumy’s ceasefire, as both sides had an interest in a successful evacuation. Ukraine did accuse Russia of breaking a similar corridor agreement in Mariupol on March 8 (that route was shelled despite another announced truce) (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters) (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters). However, for Sumy, Ukrainian officials acknowledged the Russian forces honored the ceasefire for the duration of the evacuations. Russian authorities also touted the successful evacuation as proof of their humanitarian efforts. The only tense moment came when an evacuation convoy encountered a column of Russian military vehicles on the road; the Ukrainian convoy halted to let them pass, avoiding an incident (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters). This indicates both sides on the ground exercised restraint in Sumy.
Likely Scenario: The Sumy operation demonstrates that localized ceasefires were achievable in areas where commanders on both sides cooperated. Thousands of civilians (including about 1,000 foreign students) were evacuated that day (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters) (Ukrainians flee besieged city of Sumy through 'humanitarian corridor' | Reuters). The ceasefire’s success was likely due to clear coordination and mutually recognized need – Sumy’s situation had drawn international attention, and both Moscow and Kyiv stood to gain diplomatically by allowing foreigners and civilians to escape harm. While fighting resumed in Sumy after the convoys left, the event showed that short truces could hold when carefully negotiated, in contrast to the chaos in Mariupol. It was a rare instance in 2022 where a ceasefire agreement was not immediately broken.
March 29, 2022 – Russian “Partial Ceasefire” around Kyiv and Chernihiv
Date & Context: During peace talks in Istanbul on March 29, 2022, Russia made a surprise announcement of a unilateral ceasefire/scale-back of operations in northern Ukraine. As a goodwill gesture, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister stated that Russian forces would “drastically reduce military activity” in the Kyiv and Chernihiv areas (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). This came as Ukrainian and Russian delegations discussed a potential broader peace deal, and it aimed to build trust. Ukraine had proposed a neutral status in exchange for security guarantees during these talks (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters).
Parties Involved: This was a unilateral Russian initiative declared by the Russian Ministry of Defense, rather than a jointly signed ceasefire. However, it was announced in the context of negotiations with Ukraine’s delegation in Turkey, so it was implicitly part of a mutual understanding to de-escalate certain fronts. Ukraine did not formally agree to pause its operations, but indicated cautious optimism about Russia’s statement. The U.S. and NATO were third-party observers to these developments, offering skepticism about Russia’s intent (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters).
Alleged Breach: Following the announcement, Russian attacks did decrease around Kyiv for a time, but fighting did not fully stop. Skirmishes and shelling continued on a smaller scale for a few days. Ukraine and Western officials treated Russia’s move as a repositioning rather than a true ceasefire, noting that Russian units began shifting away from Kyiv but not fully ceasing combat (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters) (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). Indeed, Russia’s pledge did not extend to other active fronts (e.g., the Donbas or Mariupol), and heavy fighting raged on there. There was no specific claim that either side “broke” this partial ceasefire – rather, it was seen as an incomplete pause.
Conflicting Claims: Ukraine reacted warily – President Zelenskyy said Russian forces could be feigning retreat and urged caution, as “the enemy is still in our territory”. The Pentagon similarly warned that the threat to Kyiv was not truly over (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). Russia, for its part, portrayed the pullback as proof of goodwill, insisting it was honoring its word by reducing attacks near Kyiv. Independent analysts pointed out that Russia was likely compelled to scale down in the north due to logistical setbacks, meaning the “ceasefire” was also driven by military necessity (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters) (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). No neutral monitor was on the ground (the OSCE mission had been suspended), so verification came from satellite imagery and intel reports. These showed Russian troops indeed withdrawing from the Kyiv outskirts in early April, albeit while launching attacks elsewhere.
Likely Scenario: The “ceasefire” around Kyiv was largely real, but unilateral and strategic. For about a week, Kyiv and Chernihiv saw a notable lull in bombardment as Russian units withdrew, which aligned with Moscow’s statement (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). However, this was not a product of trust or formal agreement – it was Russia recalibrating its war efforts after suffering losses. Ukraine continued limited defensive actions and did not relax its vigilance, so to that extent the pause was one-sided. The likely reality is that Russia’s gesture was intended to improve negotiating leverage and refit its forces; Western intelligence noted Russian movements were “more of a repositioning than a withdrawal” (Russia pledges to reduce attack on Kyiv but U.S. warns threat not over | Reuters). In sum, while not a classic ceasefire, the late March de-escalation around Kyiv temporarily reduced fighting there, paving the way for Russia’s full retreat from Northern Ukraine by early April 2022.
May 16–20, 2022 – Azovstal Surrender Ceasefire in Mariupol
Date & Context: In May 2022, the last Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol were holed up in the Azovstal steel works, surrounded by Russian forces after months of siege. Around May 16, 2022, a local ceasefire was effectively reached to end the battle: Ukrainian commanders negotiated terms to surrender the Azovstal garrison in exchange for a halt to hostilities and humanitarian considerations. Fighting at the steel plant ceased around May 16–17 as surrender talks progressed (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). By May 20, over 1,900 Ukrainian fighters had laid down arms and been evacuated to Russian-controlled territory (Russia says nearly 700 more Mariupol fighters surrender | Reuters) (Russia says nearly 700 more Mariupol fighters surrender | Reuters). This marked the end of the Battle of Mariupol.
Parties Involved: The Russian military and separatist DPR forces on one side, and the Ukrainian Azov Regiment, Marines, and other units inside Azovstal on the other, directly negotiated this ceasefire/surrender. The Ukrainian government and international organizations like the United Nations and Red Cross were also involved in back-channel talks (Russia says nearly 700 more Mariupol fighters surrender | Reuters). President Zelensky’s office coordinated the eventual capitulation, with the UN and ICRC helping ensure the wounded were safely taken out (Russia says nearly 700 more Mariupol fighters surrender | Reuters).
Alleged Breach: This ceasefire held as intended: it was implemented to allow a full surrender and evacuation, so neither side broke it. Once the agreement took effect, Russian forces stopped their assault on Azovstal, and Ukrainian defenders emerged from bunkers to surrender. No further combat was reported in that area during the handover. The main concern became the treatment of prisoners rather than fighting.
Conflicting Claims: While there was little dispute that combat had ceased, each side framed the outcome differently. Russia claimed full victory, asserting that Ukrainian forces in Azovstal “voluntarily laid down arms” after being cornered, crediting its siege tactics. Ukraine, however, emphasized that its fighters “completed their mission” and were evacuated under orders, implying a deal rather than a simple surrender. To manage public perception, Ukrainian officials avoided the term “surrender” initially, saying a “ceasefire” allowed their troops to be saved. No accusations of truce violations arose – both sides abided by the terms long enough to complete the capitulation. Internationally, the halt in fighting was seen as a pragmatic step to spare lives. Notably, a Reuters analysis months later referred to this event as the last time a genuine truce occurred in the war up to that point (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters).
Likely Scenario: The Azovstal ceasefire was a mutually agreed pause that facilitated the only large-scale surrender of Ukrainian troops in this war. Given the hopeless situation for the defenders and Russia’s military superiority on site, both sides had incentives: Ukraine wanted to save its personnel, and Russia wanted Mariupol secured without further losses. The evidence (video of troops leaving Azovstal unharmed under Russian watch, absence of gunfire) confirms that hostilities did stop completely for the evacuation period. Experts note this truce was tightly localized and contingent on surrender – it did not reflect a broader peace, but rather a tactical arrangement (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). In summary, the ceasefire held as a humanitarian measure, ending active combat in Mariupol and yielding a Russian-controlled city. It would be the last agreed cessation of fighting for many months.
January 6–7, 2023 – Orthodox Christmas Ceasefire Proposal
Date & Context: Amid continued heavy fighting in the Donbas, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a 36-hour nationwide ceasefire to coincide with Orthodox Christmas, from noon January 6 to midnight January 7, 2023 (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia) (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). The stated aim was to allow Orthodox Christians (especially in Ukraine) to attend Christmas services. This unilateral announcement came after Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church appealed for a holiday truce (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia). Ukraine’s government was immediately skeptical of this sudden gesture.
Parties Involved: The ceasefire was unilaterally ordered by Russia – it involved the Russian Armed Forces halting offensive operations along the front line. However, Ukraine did not agree to any pause, and in fact flatly rejected the idea of a truce. No international mediators were directly involved, though the move was publicly welcomed by some (e.g., Turkey) and viewed cautiously by others (the U.S. and EU). Front-line commanders of Russian units (except Wagner Group mercenaries, who pointedly refused to join the truce (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia)) were instructed to comply, while Ukraine’s forces were not bound by any agreement.
Alleged Breach: In practice, the ceasefire had little effect on the ground. Fighting continued in multiple areas. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian troops shelled positions in the Kreminna and Bakhmut areas on January 6 despite the supposed ceasefire, and that Ukrainian forces had returned fire. Russia’s defense ministry, on the other hand, claimed it was observing the truce but came under attack by Ukraine, especially in Donetsk. Because Ukraine never consented, it’s arguable there was no mutual ceasefire at all, merely a unilateral Russian pause (and even that pause was not fully observed by Russian side units). Essentially, both sides continued hostilities to some degree during the 36-hour window, meaning the truce was broken almost immediately after going into effect (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia).
Conflicting Claims: Ukraine’s leadership dismissed the ceasefire as a “cynical trap.” President Zelenskyy said Moscow only wanted a break to “use Christmas as cover” to resupply and stop Ukrainian advances (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). He and other Ukrainian officials noted that Russia had not respected holiday truces in the past and saw this as a propaganda ploy (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia). Russia, in turn, insisted it was upholding the ceasefire on its end. Putin’s government accused Ukraine of intransigence for refusing to reciprocate, and reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions. Third-party observers had limited ability to verify events, but news reporters and analysts on the ground noted ongoing artillery fire in hotspots like Bakhmut during the supposed truce (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia). Western governments sided with Kyiv’s view; the U.S. State Department called Putin’s move “cynical” and a possible feint, warning that Russia might use any lull to regroup its military (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters) (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). Indeed, even a Russian-installed separatist leader (Denis Pushilin of Donetsk) openly stated, “There can be no talk of any truce” on his side, undercutting Moscow’s own ceasefire order (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters).
Likely Scenario: The Orthodox Christmas ceasefire was largely a symbolic gesture that failed to halt the war. Reports from 6–7 January confirm sporadic fighting never stopped, especially in eastern Ukraine (2023 Russian Christmas truce proposal - Wikipedia). It’s likely Russian forces did scale down some attacks for those two days – for example, no major new offensives were launched – but they did not fully cease fire. Ukrainian forces, not recognizing the truce, kept up pressure. The absence of mutual agreement doomed this ceasefire from the start. Military analysts note that such unilateral ceasefires are often aimed at shaping public opinion or seeking a short operational pause, rather than genuinely starting a peace process. This instance followed that pattern: it did not bring any meaningful respite to civilians nor progress toward negotiations. By the night of Jan 7, intense combat simply resumed across the front as if nothing had happened. In sum, the Christmas 2023 ceasefire attempt was short-lived and effectively ignored, underscoring the deep mistrust between the parties.
June 14, 2024 – Putin’s Ceasefire Ultimatum at Foreign Ministry Meeting
Date & Context: By mid-2024, the war had become a grinding conflict with both sides dug in. On June 14, 2024, President Putin publicly outlined Russia’s terms for any ceasefire and peace deal during a meeting with his Foreign Ministry leadership (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). This was the most detailed demand Putin had made to end the war. It was timed a day before a scheduled international peace conference in Switzerland (to which Russia was not invited), indicating Moscow’s intent to preempt that summit with its own position (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters).
Parties Involved: This pronouncement was a unilateral Russian declaration of conditions. The terms included Ukraine’s government and thus implicitly involved Ukraine as the other party, though Ukraine was not consulted in drafting them. Essentially, Russia said it would agree to a ceasefire only if Ukraine complied with several maximalist conditions. No direct negotiations were happening at that moment; these statements were aimed at the international community and Ukrainian leadership.
Alleged Breach: Since this was not an implemented ceasefire but rather an offer, there was no “breach” in the conventional sense. Instead, fighting continued unabated while these demands were rejected. In the weeks around this ultimatum, hostilities (including Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and Russian defensive actions) were ongoing. The ceasefire that Putin described never took effect because Ukraine did not accept the ultimatum.
Conflicting Claims: Russia’s position (Putin’s demands) was that for the war to stop, Ukraine must: 1) renounce its ambition to join NATO, and 2) cede the entirety of the four regions Russia claimed to have annexed (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson) (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). He also reiterated that Ukraine must demilitarize and accept “neutrality,” and that Western sanctions on Russia should be lifted as part of a deal (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). Ukraine immediately rejected these terms, with President Zelenskyy and top aides calling it a “fully unacceptable ultimatum” (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). Ukrainian officials said Putin was essentially asking for Ukrainian surrender and legal recognition of Russia’s conquests, which Kyiv flatly refused. They stressed that Russia was demanding Ukraine give up sovereign territory, which was absurd and impossible from Ukraine’s perspective (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). No third-party mediator endorsed Putin’s terms; Western allies backed Ukraine’s rejection, while Russia claimed its demands were the only “realistic” path to ceasefire.
Likely Scenario: Putin’s June 2024 statement was not a genuine offer of compromise but a restatement of war aims. It underscored that Russia would only cease fire on its own terms – terms tantamount to Ukraine’s capitulation. The immediate Ukrainian rejection was expected, as conceding those territories and abandoning NATO aspirations would violate Ukraine’s core interests and earlier public positions. Consequently, this “ceasefire proposal” served to harden each side’s stance. Experts noted that Moscow’s confidence had grown slightly due to battlefield dynamics, hence the demanding tone (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). The likely reality is that neither side was ready for a ceasefire in mid-2024: Russia was insisting on territorial gains, and Ukraine was in the middle of counteroffensive efforts to reclaim land. This event illustrates why numerous diplomatic overtures in 2023–2024 failed – the preconditions set by Russia were far removed from what Ukraine (or its supporters) could ever accept. Thus, fighting dragged on into 2025 with no ceasefire or peace deal in sight.
Ongoing Situation (2025) – No Current Ceasefire
Context: As of early 2025, the Russo-Ukrainian war continues with high intensity, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine. Despite various international calls for a ceasefire or peace talks (from the UN, Turkey, China, and others), no new ceasefire agreement has been reached between Ukraine and Russia. Occasional local and humanitarian pauses have been proposed (for example, calls to demilitarize the area around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant), but these have not resulted in any lasting or widely observed ceasefire. Both Kyiv and Moscow maintain conditions that the other finds unacceptable: Ukraine demands Russian withdrawal from its territory, and Russia insists Ukraine acknowledge the territorial status quo of occupied regions. This stalemate means that, at present, there is no formal ceasefire in effect, and daily combat and shelling continue along multiple frontlines. Any future ceasefire will likely require significant shifts in these positions or increased international mediation.
Summary: Patterns of Ceasefire Violations and Trends (2021–2025)
Across the 2021–2025 period, ceasefire agreements between Ukraine and Russia have been repeatedly short-lived and fraught with mutual distrust. Several clear patterns emerge:
Immediate Breakdowns: Most ceasefires, whether local truces or broader agreements, tended to break down almost as soon as they began. In 2021, the Donbas ceasefire re-commitment eroded within weeks. In 2022, humanitarian pauses (Mariupol, Sumy) often collapsed under fire the same day. Even unilateral gestures like the 2023 Christmas truce failed to truly halt fighting. The consistent inability to maintain a ceasefire for long indicates extremely low trust and poor communication between forces. Each side feared the other would exploit the lull, which often became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Mutual Accusations: In every instance, Ukraine and Russia (or its proxy forces) have blamed each other for violations. This symmetry of accusations was seen in Donbas skirmishes (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters), in the Mariupol corridor failures (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia) (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia), and during attempted pauses in 2022. Without neutral peacekeepers on the ground (the OSCE monitoring mission ended in March 2022), it has been difficult to verify claims. However, neutral reports – e.g. the OSCE in early 2022, or the ICRC in Mariupol – did record widespread ceasefire breaches without attributing them, implying that firing was coming from both sides in many cases. This cycle of claim and counter-claim hardened attitudes; each violation (real or alleged) deepened skepticism about the next ceasefire.
Role of Third Parties: International actors have repeatedly called for ceasefires or facilitated them, but with limited success. The OSCE achieved a measure of calm with the July 2020 ceasefire and its December 2021 renewal, but it lacked enforcement power (OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine | Reuters). The United Nations appealed for humanitarian pauses (e.g. the 4-day Easter pause in April 2022) (U.N. chief calls for four-day humanitarian pause in fighting in Ukraine | Reuters) (U.N. chief calls for four-day humanitarian pause in fighting in Ukraine | Reuters), yet these were ignored as fighting intensified. Neutral intermediaries like the ICRC played a crucial role in arranging corridors, but even then precision in agreements was lacking, as the ICRC noted in March 2022 (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia). Turkey mediated talks that yielded the March 29, 2022 partial de-escalation and later the July 2022 grain export deal, showing that diplomacy was possible for narrow objectives. Overall, third-party involvement helped on the margins (humanitarian efforts, prisoner swaps), but no comprehensive ceasefire or peace deal has been achievable due to core political disagreements.
Strategic Motives and Violations: There is evidence that each side has, at times, violated or avoided ceasefires for strategic gain. For instance, Western officials accused Russia of offering ceasefires only to regroup its military and then resume attacks (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters) (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). This was a concern in 2014–2015 (Minsk accords) and remains so – as Ned Price put it, Russia might “use any temporary pause in fighting to rest, refit, and ultimately re-attack” (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters). Ukraine, on the other hand, has been unwilling to entertain ceasefires that freeze the conflict in place (and thereby reward Russian territorial gains). President Zelensky’s August 2022 statement that a fake peace would be a “trap” (Zelensky: Ukraine not ready to sign ceasefire deal with Russia.) encapsulates Kyiv’s view – earlier ceasefires like Minsk allowed Russia to consolidate, so Ukraine believes fighting on is preferable to a premature truce that Russia could exploit. This dynamic means both sides often perceive continuing the war as less risky than pausing it under unfavorable terms.
Humanitarian Impact: The failure of ceasefires has had dire humanitarian consequences. In the Donbas, civilians continued to suffer low-level shelling throughout 2021. The collapse of the Mariupol ceasefires in March 2022 left tens of thousands of people trapped in an “apocalyptic” siege (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia) (Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia), and scenes of civilians under fire were frequent (Fighting traps residents in Mariupol; Putin calls on Ukraine to surrender | Reuters). Even brief observances, like the successful Sumy corridor, saved lives but were limited in scope. The inability to maintain a lasting ceasefire means that millions of civilians have remained under the threat of violence, and aid delivery in conflict zones has been severely hampered. This pattern continued into 2023 and 2024, where calls for demilitarized safe zones (around nuclear facilities or ports) went unheeded.
No End in Sight (as of 2025): The trends above culminate in a stalemate: Ukraine and Russia have diametrically opposed war aims, making ceasefire agreements extremely hard to broker or uphold. Ukraine insists on restoring its territorial integrity, whereas Russia (as of 2024) insists on keeping annexed areas – a gap so wide that ceasefire talks stall immediately (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters) (Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum' | Reuters). Both sides also face domestic pressures to not concede (“no Minsk-3” has become a mantra in Ukraine (Zelensky: Ukraine not ready to sign ceasefire deal with Russia.), and Putin similarly cannot easily retreat from his maximalist stance). Thus, smaller-scale or local ceasefires (often humanitarian) were the only ones observed, and even those were often broken. Without robust monitoring and both sides’ genuine buy-in, any announced truce tended to be a temporary and fragile pause in an otherwise relentless conflict.
In conclusion, the 2021–2025 period demonstrates that ceasefires in the Ukraine–Russia war have been ephemeral at best. Each attempt was undermined by lack of trust, strategic opportunism, and irreconcilable political goals. Patterns of immediate violations and blame-trading were common, and even international facilitation could not overcome the fundamental impasse. The war’s ceasefire failures highlight why the conflict has been so difficult to freeze or resolve – any pause has been viewed less as a step to peace and more as a tactical timeout by the adversary. Lasting peace will likely require not just a ceasefire, but a comprehensive settlement addressing the core territorial and security disputes; until then, ceasefire agreements will remain fragile and often short-lived (Zelensky: Ukraine not ready to sign ceasefire deal with Russia.) (Putin's call for Orthodox Christmas truce in Ukraine greeted with scepticism | Reuters).