What Were Tariffs Before 2025 between China and the US
By late 2024, the United States–China trade relationship remained tense yet deeply interwoven. China was one of America’s largest trading partners – the third-biggest export market and a top import source[1] – but trade was constrained by numerous tariffs, export controls, and policy frictions. Despite talk of “decoupling,” two-way trade still reached hundreds of billions of dollars (the U.S. trade deficit with China was about $295 billion in 2024, its largest with any country[1]). Experts note that the trade war launched in 2018 never fully ended, as elevated tariffs and restrictions remained largely in place[2]. The result was a fragile truce – with high tariffs on both sides, limited agreements, and ongoing strategic competition shaping the commerce between Washington and Beijing.
Tariffs and Duties in Place
Section 301 Tariffs (Trade War Duties): The U.S. maintained sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods first imposed in 2018 under Section 301 (in response to China’s intellectual property and technology transfer practices). These tariffs originally hit ~$370 billion worth of imports with rates of 7.5%–25%. As of late 2024, the Biden administration kept in force roughly $360 billion of these Trump-era tariffs[3] and even increased certain rates on strategic products. For example, tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles were quadrupled from 25% to 100%, duties on some semiconductors doubled, and tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum were tripled[3]. These hikes – effective fall 2024 – pushed many Section 301 rates to 25–50% (or even 100% on select items like EVs)[4][5]. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in 2024 concluded a required four-year review of the China tariffs, opting not only to retain them but to expand tariffs on key sectors (e.g. batteries, medical supplies, solar components) with phased increases through 2025–26[4][6]. Over 350 product-specific exclusions (temporary waivers) were maintained for certain imports, though many expired in mid-2024 as officials signaled importers should source elsewhere[7][8]. In sum, by the end of 2024 the U.S. still levied punitive tariffs of 7.5%–25% (or higher) on about two-thirds of all Chinese goods, a core pressure tactic carried over from the trade war.
Section 232 Tariffs (Metals): Separately, since 2018 the U.S. has imposed global “national security” tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports, which still apply to Chinese metals[9]. Unlike some allies who later got quota agreements or exemptions, China remained subject to these duties. In 2024, the Biden administration even layered the Section 301 increases on top of Section 232 – effectively raising total import taxes on Chinese steel to ~47% and aluminum to ~32% when both sets of tariffs are combined[9]. (Many of these products also face existing antidumping or subsidy duties, adding further charges[10].) Beijing has long protested the steel/aluminum duties; in 2023, a WTO panel ruled that China’s retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. metals tariffs were inconsistent with WTO rules[11][12] (just as an earlier WTO case found the U.S.’s steel tariffs themselves violated trade obligations[13] – though both disputes remain unresolved due to appeals).
Other Duties and Remedies: The U.S. also continued to enforce other trade remedies on China. Notably, a safeguard tariff on imported solar panels (first set in 2018 at 30%) was extended by President Biden in Feb 2022 for four more years (through early 2026) with some modifications[14]. This measure, aimed largely at Chinese solar suppliers, maintained tariffs (with an increased quota for tariff-free solar cells and an exemption for certain bifacial panels) to protect U.S. solar manufacturing[14]. In addition, dozens of antidumping and countervailing duty orders – predating and separate from the trade war – remained in effect on Chinese products ranging from steel and aluminum extrusions to chemicals, tires, and furniture. These duties, often in the range of antidumping tariffs or anti-subsidy fees, continue to be imposed to remedy “unfair” pricing or subsidies under U.S. trade law. All told, by late 2024 Chinese exports faced an unprecedented web of U.S. import taxes: broad Section 301 and 232 tariffs, special safeguards, and numerous case-by-case duties, reflecting the sustained protectionist turn in U.S. policy toward China[3][10].
Trade Agreements and Dialogues
“Phase One” Trade Agreement: The primary bilateral trade agreement in effect was the U.S.-China “Phase One” deal, signed in January 2020. This limited accord (formally, the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the U.S. and PRC) paused further tariff escalation and required China to implement structural reforms in several areas[15]. China agreed to strengthen intellectual property protections, curb forced technology transfer, open its financial services sector, and remove some agricultural trade barriers, among other commitments[15][16]. Critically, Beijing also pledged to purchase an extra $200 billion of U.S. goods and services over 2020–2021 above pre-trade-war levels[17]. In return, the U.S. canceled some planned tariffs and halved the tariff rate on a $120 billion list of consumer goods (from 15% to 7.5%) in early 2020. However, the Phase One pact’s outcomes were mixed. While China did introduce certain legal changes – e.g. improving IP laws and formally prohibiting forced tech transfers – and increased imports of U.S. farm goods and energy, it fell well short of the purchase targets set by the agreement[18][19]. By the end of 2021, independent analyses showed China bought only around 60% of the extra U.S. goods it had promised, failing to meet the $200 billion goal[19]. U.S. officials criticized this shortfall, and in 2022 the USTR even launched a Section 301 review of China’s compliance[20] (signaling continued concerns over China’s follow-through). Notably, Phase One did not address many contentious issues – such as China’s industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, or cyber theft – effectively kicking these harder topics down the road[17]. A hoped-for “Phase Two” deal never materialized as relations soured. Thus, by late 2024 the Phase One agreement had largely run its course: its two-year purchase commitments had expired, and most tariffs from the trade war remained in place, but the deal’s modest structural provisions and enforcement mechanism persisted as a point of engagement.
Absence of Broader Free Trade Agreements: Beyond Phase One, no comprehensive trade treaty exists between the U.S. and China. China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which greatly expanded commerce under WTO rules[21], but the two countries have not negotiated any bilateral free trade agreement. (Earlier talks on a Bilateral Investment Treaty stalled and were not concluded.) In the multilateral sphere, the U.S. and China find themselves in separate trade blocs: for instance, China is part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia, and it has sought entry into the CPTPP trade pact – ventures from which the U.S. is absent. Instead, the U.S. has pursued initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (launched 2022) with allies (excluding China) to set standards on trade, supply chains, and technology. The only shared multilateral framework remains the WTO, where both nations are members and bound by WTO agreements. However, even in the WTO, their relationship is fraught (as discussed below). In late 2023, the U.S. and China did resume some high-level economic dialogues – for example, cabinet-level meetings and a re-established export control information exchange – aiming to stabilize the trade relationship. But no new trade agreements or tariff rollbacks emerged from these talks as of December 2024. In essence, U.S.-China trade is operating without a broad trade accord, governed instead by Phase One’s narrow terms, WTO rules under strain, and each country’s unilateral measures.
Export Controls and Technology Restrictions
Advanced Technology Export Controls: The U.S. has increasingly used export controls to restrict China’s access to cutting-edge technologies, citing national security concerns. In October 2022, the Biden administration unveiled sweeping export control rules targeting China’s semiconductor sector. These rules – an “unprecedented” tightening of tech trade – ban the export to China of certain high-performance computer chips, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and software unless licensed[22]. Essentially, Washington sought to hobble Beijing’s ability to obtain or produce advanced logic and memory chips needed for artificial intelligence and supercomputing, which could have military uses. The rules also added dozens of Chinese tech companies (chip fabs, equipment makers, etc.) to the Commerce Department’s Entity List, fully blocking U.S. exports to those entities[23][24]. In 2023, the U.S. tightened these controls further – updating rules to close loopholes and coordinating with allies (like Japan and the Netherlands) to deny China crucial lithography machines and tools[25][26]. The Biden administration emphasized that no prior U.S. government had been “tougher” on strategically restricting China’s military-related tech[25]. These measures aim to impair China’s ability to develop advanced semiconductors and AI by cutting off inputs[27][28]. As a result, Chinese firms are blocked from acquiring the most advanced 5G chips, high-end GPUs, chip-making machinery, and other sensitive tech from U.S. suppliers. For example, Huawei Technologies – China’s telecom giant – remains blacklisted, and as of January 2023 the U.S. ceased granting any export licenses for companies to sell to Huawei[29]. Biden has upheld Trump-era bans on Huawei and in November 2021 even signed legislation to bar Huawei and similar companies from U.S. telecom networks[29]. Beyond Huawei, new U.S. rules (under the 2022 CHIPS Act) prohibit any Chinese company from obtaining advanced chips or equipment made with U.S. technology[30]. In short, by 2024 the U.S. maintained a de facto embargo on advanced tech exports to China in sectors like semiconductors, aerospace, and quantum computing.
Investment and Data Restrictions: The U.S. has also moved to restrict financial and knowledge flows connected to sensitive technology. In August 2023, President Biden issued an executive order establishing an outbound investment screening program. This will ban or require notification of U.S. investments in certain Chinese tech sectors – specifically semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence – that could enhance China’s military capabilities[3]. The new rules (set to take effect in 2024) mean U.S. venture capital or private equity can be barred from funding Chinese firms involved in cutting-edge chip design or AI, closing a gap in export controls[22]. Additionally, under domestic security laws, Chinese tech like TikTok has come under scrutiny (with pending efforts to restrict its U.S. operations over data security fears). The U.S. has also banned federal agencies and contractors from using Chinese telecom and video surveillance equipment (e.g. gear from Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision) via the 2019 NDAA and FCC rules. And in June 2022, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) took effect, blocking imports from China’s Xinjiang region due to human rights concerns[31]. Under UFLPA’s rebuttable presumption, any goods mined or made in Xinjiang (such as cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon) are assumed to be made with forced labor and are barred from entry into the U.S. unless importers prove otherwise[31]. This policy has halted many Chinese shipments in those sectors, adding another layer of restriction on trade. Overall, as of late 2024, U.S. policy toward China features an unprecedented “technology decoupling” effort – leveraging export regulations, blacklist sanctions, investment curbs, and import bans – all aimed at preventing critical U.S.-origin know-how and products from aiding China’s military and surveillance ambitions[3][30]. These controls operate alongside tariffs, underscoring that national security has become a dominant factor in U.S.-China trade relations.
China’s Retaliatory Tariffs and Responses
Beijing’s Tariff Countermeasures: China has answered U.S. tariffs with its own retaliatory duties on American exports since 2018. As the Trump administration rolled out Section 301 tariffs in waves, China reciprocally imposed tariffs – often 5% to 25% – on U.S. goods of equivalent value. For example, when the U.S. hit $34 billion of Chinese products with 25% tariffs in mid-2018, Beijing immediately levied 25% on $34 billion of U.S. exports (targeting commodities like soybeans, pork, and SUVs)[32]. This tit-for-tat continued: China matched the next $16 billion U.S. tranche with 25% on $16 billion of U.S. goods[33], and for the U.S.’s $200 billion “List 3” tariffs, China retaliated on about $60 billion worth of U.S. products (initially at 5–10% rates, later raised up to 25% on some items)[34]. By September 2019, when the U.S. moved to tax a final $120 billion list of Chinese consumer goods, Beijing announced tariffs of 5% or 10% on roughly $75 billion of remaining U.S. exports (including crude oil and small aircraft)[35]. However, as part of the 2020 Phase One truce, China scaled back those last tariffs – halving the 10% and 5% rates to 5% and 2.5%, respectively, in February 2020[35]. After that partial de-escalation, China left in place a patchwork of duties on U.S. goods while refraining from new tariff hikes. By early 2020, China’s average tariff on imports from the U.S. stood around 20–21% (versus ~8% pre-trade-war), with Chinese tariffs covering about 58% of U.S. exports (roughly $90 billion worth of trade, based on 2017 volumes)[36][37]. These duties hit U.S. farm products (soybeans, fruits, meats), energy commodities, and manufactured goods (autos, chemicals, etc.), causing U.S. exporters to lose market share in China.
Chinese Policy Adjustments: To mitigate the impact, Beijing implemented mechanisms like tariff exemption programs. Starting in 2019–2020, China allowed importers to apply for exclusions from retaliatory tariffs for purchasing certain U.S. products[19]. This effectively offered tariff waivers (for example, to encourage purchases of U.S. soybeans, LNG, or medical goods when needed). These ad-hoc exemptions helped China meet some Phase One import targets despite the formal tariffs. Additionally, China shifted supply chains – finding alternative suppliers (e.g. sourcing soybeans from Brazil) and boosting self-reliance in products hit by U.S. tariffs. In areas like technology, China accelerated efforts to substitute U.S. inputs (for instance, promoting domestic semiconductor development in response to U.S. chip sanctions). China also pursued trade diversification via new trade agreements (such as RCEP) to reduce dependence on the U.S. market.
U.S. Responses: The United States, for its part, has maintained that China’s retaliatory tariffs were unjustified. Washington argued that because its own tariffs were in response to unfair practices, China should not retaliate in kind. The U.S. even challenged China’s retaliation on the separate steel/aluminum tariffs at the WTO – and won a panel ruling in 2023 that China’s 15–25% duties on $3 billion of U.S. goods (imposed in 2018 against U.S. metal tariffs) violated WTO rules[11]. (China had tried to characterize those counter-tariffs as safeguards, but the panel rejected that defense[38].) China, in turn, has demanded the U.S. drop its Section 232 metals tariffs, pointing to a 2022 WTO decision against the U.S. measures[13]. Both sides have appealed the adverse rulings, effectively stalling any compliance due to the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have pressed China on other forms of retaliation – such as export restrictions that China announced on certain raw materials (for instance, China’s late-2023 controls on exporting gallium and germanium, critical minerals used in chips, seen as retaliation for U.S. tech curbs). Washington’s primary response, however, has been to hold firm on existing tariffs until more substantive issues are resolved. The Biden administration has left almost all Trump-era tariffs in place, using them as leverage for future negotiations. USTR did engage in discussions with China in 2023 about meeting purchase commitments and possibly reducing tariffs, but as of end-2024 no tariff rollback deal had been reached. Thus, the status quo persisted: each country imposes high tariffs on the other’s goods (with selective relief via exclusions), and both continue to litigate the legitimacy of those tariffs in international forums without resolution.
Disputes and Trade-Policy Mechanisms
WTO Litigation: The U.S.-China trade conflict has increasingly played out at the World Trade Organization, albeit without resolution. In 2018, China filed a WTO complaint (DS543) challenging the U.S. Section 301 tariffs as a violation of WTO rules. A WTO dispute panel ruled in September 2020 that the U.S. tariffs breached core obligations – finding that the additional duties violated Most-Favored-Nation treatment and exceeded U.S. tariff bindings[39]. The panel also rejected Washington’s defense that the tariffs were justified by a “public morals” exception (the U.S. had argued that China’s IP theft was contrary to public morals, but the panel found the connection between the tariffs and protecting public morals unproven)[40][41]. However, the U.S. immediately appealed the panel report into the void of the non-functioning Appellate Body, meaning the ruling has not been adopted or enforced[42]. Similarly, China sued the U.S. over the Section 232 steel/aluminum tariffs; a WTO panel in late 2022 sided against the U.S., deeming the national security tariffs inconsistent with WTO rules[13]. The U.S. has maintained its position that those actions are exempt as security measures and has also appealed that decision. On the flip side, the U.S. challenged China’s retaliatory tariffs at the WTO (arguing Beijing had no legal right to “rebalance” unilaterally since the U.S. tariffs were not safeguards). In August 2023, a WTO panel ruled China’s retaliatory tariffs on $2.4 billion of U.S. goods (in response to Section 232 metals) were indeed WTO-inconsistent[11][43]. Beijing has signaled it will appeal as well, leaving the dispute unresolved. In short, both nations have turned to the WTO dispute system but effectively blocked it from delivering a final word, opting instead to retain their trade measures. This stalemate underscores broader U.S. frustration with the WTO’s inability to address China’s state-driven practices, and China’s objections to unilateral U.S. tactics.
Trade Investigations and Enforcement: The United States has continued to deploy domestic trade statutes to investigate and counter Chinese practices. The original 2017–2018 Section 301 investigation (focused on IP and technology transfer) set the stage for tariffs. In 2024, the Biden administration initiated new Section 301 investigations into other areas of China’s economy. In April 2024, USTR launched a Section 301 probe into China’s industrial subsidies and support for its shipbuilding, shipping, and logistics sectors[44][45], responding to petitions from U.S. industries concerned about subsidized Chinese shipyards dominating global markets. Then in December 2024, the administration announced a Section 301 investigation into China’s “foundational” semiconductor industry – examining China’s state-led efforts to boost mature chips and whether they harm U.S. economic interests[46]. These investigations will take months to conclude and could lead to new tariffs or trade restrictions if they find that Chinese policies (e.g. subsidies or market barriers) are unreasonable and burden U.S. commerce. Additionally, U.S. authorities have ramped up anti-circumvention enforcement – e.g. investigating allegations that Chinese steel or solar products are shipped via third countries to evade duties[47][48]. In one high-profile example, the Commerce Department in 2022–2023 probed solar panel imports from Southeast Asia, suspecting they actually contained Chinese-made cells subject to tariffs. In parallel, U.S. customs (CBP) is enforcing bans on goods made with forced labor (as noted with UFLPA) and has increased screenings of Chinese imports for banned content (like apparel linked to Xinjiang).
National Security Screening: The U.S. government also uses tools like CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.) to police Chinese economic involvement. Throughout 2020–2024, CFIUS continued to block or unwind Chinese investments in sensitive sectors – for instance, preventing the acquisition of U.S. tech firms, dating apps, semiconductor companies, and even land near military bases by Chinese entities. High-profile cases include the ongoing scrutiny of TikTok (whose Chinese owner ByteDance has been pressured to divest U.S. operations over data security) and the prohibition of Chinese telecoms from U.S. networks. Such actions, though not tariffs, form a parallel track of restricting China’s economic reach on security grounds. The Biden administration also pursued a policy of forming coalitions with allies to address Chinese trade practices – for example, coordinating with the EU and Japan to condemn China’s non-market policies at the WTO, and discussing “friendshoring” of supply chains for critical products (like critical minerals and batteries) to reduce reliance on China.
In summary, as 2024 ended, the U.S.-China trade relationship was defined less by mutual agreements and more by tit-for-tat restrictions and enforcement measures. Tariffs on hundreds of billions in goods – notably the Section 301 duties – remained firmly in place, with the Biden administration tweaking but largely maintaining Trump’s tariff regime[3]. Trade agreements were limited to the narrow Phase One deal, with no comprehensive deal bridging the two economic giants. Instead, export controls and investment curbs emerged as powerful new tools, reflecting U.S. concerns about China’s technological rise[22]. China responded with its own tariffs, lawsuits, and efforts to circumvent U.S. measures, all while promoting alternative partnerships. Both sides leveraged WTO rules and broke them, highlighting the multilateral system’s strain under great-power frictions[39][13]. Going into 2025, the status quo was an uneasy equilibrium of high barriers: a heavily managed trade flow subject to tariffs, licensing, and scrutiny rather than the freer trade once envisioned. While dialogue channels had cautiously reopened, substantive compromise remained elusive – underscoring that the U.S.-China trade relationship, as of late 2024, was as much about strategic competition as it was about commerce.
Sources: U.S. Trade Representative and White House releases; Council on Foreign Relations backgrounders; WTO dispute summaries; Reuters and Bloomberg reporting on tariffs and export controls[3][12][39][29], among others. (All information is current as of December 2024 and reflects official policies in effect at that time.)
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[31] Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: Commercial Implications, Compliance Challenges and Responses | White & Case LLP
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[46] FACT SHEET: President Biden Takes Action to Protect American Workers and Businesses from China’s Unfair Trade Practices in the Semiconductor Sector | The White House