When tariffs double costs overnight, who pays the price—retail giants, small suppliers, or American shoppers?
Tariff Shockwave: How a Sudden 100% Tariff on China Could Upend Walmart, Target, and Small Brands
“If suppliers can’t swallow the cost, and retailers refuse price hikes, smaller brands face a stark choice: lose money or lose their spot on store shelves.”
In a sudden escalation of a trade war scenario, a 100% tariff on Chinese imports would double the cost of goods sourced from China virtually overnight. Big-box retailers like Walmart and Target – which source a large share of their inventory from China (Walmart alone has been estimated at ~60% (Walmart clashes with China after asking suppliers to absorb tariffs)) – would face immediate pressure to adjust procurement strategies and pricing. The shock would ripple through existing supply contracts, pricing agreements, and inventory on order. Smaller brands that manufacture in China and sell through these retail giants would be caught in the crossfire, forced to navigate drastic cost increases with thin margins and limited leverage. Below, we analyze how purchase orders might be handled, who bears the cost of tariffs, how small suppliers can respond (or struggle to), and what history teaches from the 2018–2019 U.S.–China tariff battles.
Impact on Existing Purchase Orders
When an abrupt tariff hike hits, existing purchase orders (POs) become a flashpoint. Retailers and suppliers must decide whether to honor, renegotiate, or cancel orders that suddenly became much more expensive:
Honoring POs at Original Terms: In some cases, contracts may obligate the parties to proceed at the agreed price even if costs surge. Absent specific clauses, a new tariff doesn’t legally void the contract – it just makes it far costlier to perform. Many agreements lack a tariff escape clause, since increased expense alone (even drastically higher costs) typically isn’t deemed force majeure or a valid excuse for non-performance (US tariffs: how will these affect commercial contracts and what can be done to mitigate any impact? | Osborne Clarke). If neither side budges, the supplier must deliver at the old price, effectively eating the tariff cost, or else breach the contract (risking litigation). This is a lose-lose scenario that could drive a small vendor into financial ruin.
Renegotiating or Canceling Orders: More often, both sides will seek a practical compromise. Importers may try to renegotiate the purchase price or terms to share the pain (US tariffs: how will these affect commercial contracts and what can be done to mitigate any impact? | Osborne Clarke). A tariff acts like a massive tax on the importer (whoever brings the goods into the U.S.), so if a retailer is the importer of record, it might insist the supplier lower its price to offset the duty. If the supplier is the importer (common when a brand ships to the retailer’s domestic warehouses), the brand may plead for a higher wholesale price to cover the tariff. In reality, parties often meet in the middle or temporarily suspend orders. If no agreement is reached, the retailer might cancel future orders entirely – even if that means short-term stockouts – to avoid paying an extra 100% on landed cost. As one legal analysis notes, an importer may determine that ending the relationship (and possibly paying a penalty) is cheaper than sticking with a now-unprofitable contract (US tariffs: how will these affect commercial contracts and what can be done to mitigate any impact? | Osborne Clarke).
Stockpiling and Shipment Timing: If advance notice exists (even a few weeks), retailers or brands might expedite deliveries to land products before the tariff effective date. During the 2018–2019 trade war, some small companies tried to front-load inventory before tariffs hit. For example, one Los Angeles apparel wholesaler “absorbed roughly half the cost” of a 10% tariff and stockpiled $500,000 of inventory ahead of implementation (Small Businesses Are Running Out of Moves in Trump’s Trade War - WSJ). However, a sudden tariff with immediate effect leaves no time for such maneuvers, freezing any in-transit orders in a costly bind.
Negotiating Who Eats the Cost of Tariffs
A 100% import tariff raises the fundamental question: Who pays for this extra cost – the retailer, the supplier (brand), or the consumer? In practice, the answer is often a tense negotiation resulting in shared pain:
(What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street) Large retailers typically push back fiercely on any cost increases. They know raising shelf prices will hurt sales in competitive markets, so their first move is to pressure suppliers to absorb the tariff instead of passing it on. Walmart, for instance, is notorious for leveraging its size to keep prices low. During the last tariff flare-up, Walmart demanded that many Chinese suppliers cut their prices by ~10% for each 10% tariff imposed – essentially asking factories to eat the cost of U.S. tariffs (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). Target and Costco took a similar stance, telling vendors to bear a significant portion of the new tariffs (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). Target reportedly even asked one Chinese supplier (of hair accessories) to take on “half the costs” of the tariff; when the supplier refused more than a 3% cut, Target delayed orders and ultimately dropped the vendor (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). This illustrates the brutal reality: if one supplier won’t absorb costs, a big retailer will seek another that will.
On the other side, suppliers – especially smaller brands – wrestle with agonizing choices. Accepting the full tariff hit means selling at a loss (which is unsustainable), but trying to pass the entire 100% increase to retailers is usually a non-starter. As MGA Entertainment’s CEO (maker of Bratz dolls) explained amid 20% tariffs, retailers “do not want to have a price increase” because consumers are already strained (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). His company anticipated “shared responsibility”, expecting to take a margin cut and pass on perhaps half the cost in higher prices (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). In a 100% tariff scenario, similar “cost-sharing” might occur – for example, a supplier might swallow 50% of the tariff by drastically reducing its own margins (or negotiating cheaper production), while the retailer agrees to a wholesale price increase to cover the other 50%. Even multinational manufacturers adopted this tactic in 2018–19: U.S. importers often negotiated lower prices from foreign factories so that overseas producers effectively paid part of the tariff out of their own pocket (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street).
Ultimately, someone must pay, and often all parties sacrifice. Retailers may accept a slimmer profit to keep items competitively priced, brands may sell with little or no margin to preserve the relationship, and consumers may still see price hikes on shelves – albeit smaller than the full 100% jump. For instance, a trade association analysis during the 2019 tariff wave found that a 46% duty would force a $155 running shoe to retail around $220 to fully offset the cost (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). Such a ~42% price increase is commercially untenable in most retail segments, so in reality the shoe’s maker and the retailers would have to find ways to absorb much of that $65 difference rather than simply charge $220. Indeed, during the last trade war, many companies initially tried raising prices but saw consumer pushback and lost sales, forcing them to retreat and eat the costs instead (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street). Americans are extremely price-sensitive, and as one observer noted, companies ended up “eating those tariffs lock, stock, and barrel” when higher prices proved unsellable (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street).
Procurement Behavior of Big-Box Retailers
Big-box retailers react to tariffs with a mix of hardball negotiation and strategic sourcing moves. Their procurement teams immediately evaluate which products are affected and how to maintain margins:
Hardball Negotiations with Suppliers: As described, giants like Walmart use their bargaining power to demand cost concessions. They will scrutinize every cost line and resist accepting price increases without proof that all other options (supplier cost cuts, alternate sourcing, product modifications) are exhausted (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). These retailers often invoke competitive pressure – “if you won’t hold your price, we have other suppliers who will”. A former supplier noted that if you’re one of 100 companies making a similar product, Walmart will say ‘99 others aren’t raising prices’ (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). This dynamic forces suppliers to consider taking losses on certain orders just to stay on the shelf. In fact, there is rampant “loss-leading” by suppliers in such times – many willingly accept razor-thin or negative margins temporarily in order to maintain a presence in major retailers, hoping to survive until conditions improve (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). As one industry CEO quipped, “It’s a wonder anyone remains in business” given how much cost pain small suppliers absorb to avoid getting delisted (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters).
SKU Pruning and Substitution: Retailers will quickly review their assortment and identify which items (or even entire brands) are now unprofitable with the tariff. If a small brand’s product becomes too expensive and negotiations fail, the retailer may drop that product in favor of alternatives. They might substitute it with a similar item from a competitor not hit by the tariff (e.g. sourced from another country) or even expand their own private-label product to replace it. For example, Nordic Ware’s CEO noted that if he couldn’t get retailers to accept a price increase on his U.S.-made Bundt pans (impacted indirectly by aluminum tariffs), stores would simply switch to another bakeware supplier offering lower prices (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). In a 100% tariff case, this substitution effect is even stronger – a retailer like Target will stop buying a Chinese-made accessory from a small brand if it can source a similar item elsewhere without the extra 100% cost. The threat of being replaced gives retailers leverage in bargaining: suppliers know losing a big-box account can be devastating.
Passing Some Cost to Consumers Strategically: Retail chains will try to avoid across-the-board price hikes, but for certain must-have items or less price-sensitive categories, they might implement selective retail price increases. They do this carefully to avoid shocking shoppers. A Target executive indicated the company would look at pricing “holistically” and it was too early to tell how prices would change item by item (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters) – implying they consider which products might tolerate a bump in price. Retailers also sometimes phase in price changes (after the required notice period) or use temporary promotions elsewhere to keep customers happy. Still, their overarching strategy in a tariff crisis is to keep shelf prices as stable as possible to protect market share (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters) (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters), which loops back to squeezing suppliers for cost relief.
(Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs) Retail giants like Walmart leverage their massive buying power to demand concessions from suppliers when tariffs hit. In past tariff showdowns, Walmart explicitly asked many Chinese manufacturers to cut prices by 10% for each new 10% tariff – effectively insisting suppliers absorb the added cost (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). This hardball approach puts smaller brands in a bind: concede margin or risk losing placement in aisles of America’s largest retailer.
Small Brands’ Strategies and Struggles
For smaller brands that supply big-box stores, a sudden 100% tariff is an existential threat. These vendors typically operate on thin margins and lack the financial buffers or diversified supply chain of larger companies. Their realistic options include:
Absorbing the Tariff (At Least Temporarily): Many small firms feel they have “nowhere to hide” from such costs and end up eating the tariff, at least in the short run (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street). This might mean drastically lower profit or even selling at a loss on each unit. Some will tap cash reserves or cut other costs to offset the tariff hit. In 2019’s trade war, small business owners reported halting expansion plans, cutting expenses, and even freezing hiring to cope with tariff-induced margin pressure (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters) (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). The logic is to survive the storm: by absorbing costs now, they maintain the retailer relationship and shelf presence, hoping the tariffs will eventually lift or they can adapt their supply chain. However, not every small company can survive long while effectively subsidizing a 100% tariff – the strain is often “existential”, as one backpack brand CEO described when facing far smaller (25–46%) tariffs (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters).
Passing Costs Through (Selective Price Increases): Some niche or premium brands attempt to raise their prices to reflect the tariff, either at the wholesale level or via MSRP increases. If the product has a unique value or loyal customer base, the brand may gamble that consumers will tolerate a higher price. For example, the maker of Bogg Bag totes (a small NJ-based brand) raised its retail price by $5 on a $85-$90 bag in response to a 20% tariff (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). That increase doesn’t fully cover the tariff cost, but it shares the burden with the consumer. Small brands must tread carefully here: big retailers usually require advance notice (often 60 days) for any price increase and will only accept it after reviewing justification (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). This means even if a brand decides to raise prices, there’s a built-in delay of months to implement – during which the brand shoulders the tariff cost (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). Moreover, a steep price jump may kill sales, in which case the retailer will discontinue the item anyway. Partial price pass-through is more common (e.g. raising price modestly to recoup some cost, while absorbing the rest), and it requires close coordination with the retailer’s merchandising team.
Re-Negotiating Terms and Supplier Concessions: A small brand can, in turn, press its own Chinese manufacturer or trading agent for better terms. Often these brands are essentially importers who contract production in China. They might ask the factory for a discount or to split the tariff cost. In some cases Chinese manufacturers, not wanting to lose long-term business, agreed to price reductions to offset U.S. tariffs (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). But a 100% tariff is extreme – few factories have enough margin to cut prices anywhere near in half. Still, anecdotal evidence from the 2018–2019 period shows some foreign producers were willing to bear part of the tax to keep their U.S. customers. This tactic tends to work if the Chinese supplier values the relationship and believes the tariffs might be temporary. It’s essentially sharing pain across the whole chain: Chinese factory lowers the FOB price, the U.S. brand takes a margin hit, and possibly the retailer pays a slightly higher wholesale price – all to avoid doubling the consumer price.
Rerouting or Changing Manufacturing: In theory, a small brand could try to circumvent the tariff by rerouting orders or shifting production to another country. However, simply rerouting (“transshipment”) without substantial transformation is illegal – customs rules of origin would still consider the goods Chinese if they’re merely shipped through a third country. The viable path is to actually move manufacturing out of China. Smaller companies scrambled to explore alternative suppliers in places like Vietnam, Cambodia, India, or Mexico during the trade war. For basic products, some U.S. retailers quickly moved orders for items like simple apparel (tops, bottoms, underwear) to other countries (US-China Trade War: Impact on Shipping & Retail - PLS Logistics). A small brand can sometimes find a new contract manufacturer in a lower-tariff country, but this is far from immediate. It involves vetting new factories, sampling products, ensuring quality, and negotiating new MOQs and prices – a process that easily takes 3–6 months or more in normal conditions. As one logistics analyst noted, many brands discovered their “long partnerships with China were too tight to break” on short notice (US-China Trade War: Impact on Shipping & Retail - PLS Logistics). No other country could instantly match China’s combination of scale, skill, and cost for many products, so short-term relocation is extremely challenging for smaller players.
Risking Delisting: The harshest option – or rather outcome – is that the small brand gets delisted (dropped) by the retailer. This can happen if the economics just don’t work out. A small supplier might conclude it simply cannot afford to fill the purchase order at the original price and also cannot convince the retailer to pay more. If neither side can absorb enough of the cost, the product will be pulled. In the Quartz report, a hair accessories supplier who balked at Target’s demand to absorb 50% of the tariff “eventually lost the business” (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs). From the retailer’s perspective, it’s better to cancel an item than carry one that would need to be priced far above competing products. For the small brand, losing a placement in Walmart or Target can be devastating – not only in lost immediate sales but also in momentum and credibility. Some will try to offset this by pivoting to online D2C sales or other channels, but replacing the volume of a big-box retailer is an uphill battle. This is why many small brands will go to great lengths (even selling at a loss for a period) to avoid being dropped; as noted, some view short-term losses as a loss-leader investment to stay on shelves (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters).
Timeframes and Flexibility in Shifting Supply Chains
Shifting suppliers or manufacturing locations in response to tariffs is a complex undertaking that hinges on timeframes and contract flexibility:
Lead Times for Moving Production: Developing a new supply chain outside of China cannot happen overnight. Industry experts note that shifting sourcing for simple products (e.g. basic apparel or toys) might be done in a few months by leveraging suppliers in alternative countries, but more complex items have “fewer alternative sourcing destinations” (US-China Trade War: Impact on Shipping & Retail - PLS Logistics). A small brand typically has to place orders 3-6 months in advance for overseas production. If a tariff hits today, any goods already in production in China will arrive with the tariff applied. The earliest a brand could get non-China production would be the next production cycle – often not until the next season’s goods. For example, Day Owl, a small backpack maker, cited a 100-day production cycle and warned that waiting too long to decide could mean missing an entire selling season (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). This underscores that even with aggressive action, a brand might endure one or two quarters of tariff pain before relief comes from a new supplier.
Contractual Flexibility with Chinese Factories: Many small brands do not have long-term exclusive contracts tying them to one factory; they often operate on purchase-order basis manufacturing. This gives some flexibility to stop ordering from one supplier and switch to another. However, any existing deposit or tooling investments in China could be at risk if they pull out suddenly. Moreover, ramping up a new factory might require upfront cash that a small firm, now bleeding from tariffs, doesn’t have. In some cases, brands have tried to split their supply – continuing some production in China (and swallowing the tariff on those units) while trialing a new factory elsewhere for part of their volume. This diversification is prudent but again takes time to execute and perfect.
Retailer Contracts and Requirements: On the retailer side, there is also contractual rigidity. As mentioned, retailers often require advance notice for price changes and don’t easily adjust previously agreed terms. A small vendor facing a tariff may appeal to the retailer for leniency or interim adjustments (for instance, asking if the purchase order can be reduced or shipment split up). Some retailers showed flexibility in timing – e.g. pushing back a ship date hoping tariffs might be rescinded, or temporarily suspending the SKU rather than outright terminating the relationship. However, such concessions are at the retailer’s discretion. The default stance in big retail contracts is that the supplier is responsible for all import duties (if they are the importer) or must adhere to the agreed cost (if the retailer imports the goods). A sudden 100% tariff isn’t typically accounted for, leaving only goodwill and negotiation to bridge the gap.
In short, shifting away from China is a long-term solution, not an immediate fix, especially for smaller brands. Tariff pressures can accelerate such plans – indeed, Target noted it had already cut its reliance on China from 60% to 30% of goods in anticipation of trade tensions (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs) – but achieving this requires significant effort and time. Smaller suppliers often find themselves struggling to hang on during the interim period where they must either pay the tariff or not have product to sell at all.
Real-World Lessons from 2018–2019 Tariff War
The U.S.–China trade war of 2018–2019 (and subsequent flare-ups) provide valuable examples of how these dynamics play out in practice, especially for small and mid-sized brands:
Cost Absorption Was Common: Despite initial panic about consumer prices skyrocketing, many companies quietly absorbed tariffs. A study of the 2018–19 tariff impact found little immediate inflation on consumer goods, precisely because companies and suppliers ate the extra costs instead of fully passing them on (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street). Big retailers essentially insulated shoppers to maintain loyalty, which meant squeezing suppliers harder and accepting lower margins themselves. The downside was profit erosion: importers’ margins took a one-time hit when tariffs came into effect (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street). For small brands, this often meant severe belt-tightening or taking on debt to cover the added duty.
Negotiations Became Contentious: Multiple news reports from that period describe intense haggling between retailers and suppliers. Reuters noted Walmart and Target were “bickering behind the scenes” with suppliers over proposed price increases on items from toys to tote bags (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). Some suppliers negotiated compromises, while others acquiesced to retailers’ demands simply to keep their products listed. The concept of “shared responsibility” for tariffs became an accepted outcome – neither side got exactly what it wanted, but each gave a little. For example, the toy maker MGA couldn’t get a full 20% price increase for a 20% tariff; instead, they planned for roughly a 10% wholesale increase with the rest absorbed in margins (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters).
Smaller Brands Suffered Disproportionately: Large firms like VF Corp or Nike managed tariffs by shifting sourcing and leveraging their global supplier base (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). They had the clout to split costs with overseas factories or to relocate production for different product lines. In contrast, smaller brands “don’t have time to wait” for political resolutions and lack diversified options (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters) (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). The Reuters piece on apparel retailers highlighted how a 6-year-old backpack company faced an “existential threat” from tariffs, with mere weeks of runway before it would run out of cash (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). Another small sportswear brand had to divert staff to brainstorm contingency plans, an extra burden on a lean organization (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). These cases show that when tariffs strike, small businesses often operate in crisis mode – halting new orders, seeking emergency financing, and praying for a policy reversal.
Creative Workarounds and Advocacy: Some mid-size importers sought relief through tariff exemption applications or re-classifying their products to reduce duty rates. Others lobbied via industry associations, arguing their niche products had no U.S. alternative and tariffs would only hurt American businesses. A few tried technical loopholes – e.g. making minor product modifications to fall under non-tariffed categories – though with a 100% across-the-board tariff on Chinese origin, there’s little room for reclassification. The 2018–2019 period did see supply lines re-route (China→Vietnam→US) to exploit different tariff treatments, but U.S. Customs cracked down on simple transshipment. The only sure workaround was moving actual production, which, as discussed, was slow and difficult. Many companies simply had to weather the storm by accepting lower profits. As one supplier told the Financial Times about Costco’s demands, larger suppliers have the muscle to absorb tariffs, but “smaller ones… ultimately [get] ‘screwed’” (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs).
(Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters) Illustrative impact of tariffs on pricing: A 46% U.S. tariff (similar to the scale of some 2019 proposals, though only half of our hypothetical 100%) would drive the retail price of a $155 item up to $220 if fully passed on (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters). Such an enormous increase would likely curb consumer demand. This is why, in reality, retailers and suppliers work to share the burden – by trimming costs and margins – instead of simply doubling prices.
Conclusion
In summary, a sudden 100% tariff on Chinese imports would force large U.S. retailers and their smaller suppliers into rapid triage mode. Existing orders might be hurried through at old prices if possible, or else thrust into tough renegotiations. Huge tariff costs cannot be fully passed to consumers without killing sales, so retailers and brands engage in a delicate dance to allocate the pain. Big retailers would leverage every bit of power to protect their own margins and keep shelf prices stable – demanding supplier concessions, finding alternate products, and in some cases accepting a modest price increase on limited items. Smaller brands, with far less cushion, face bleak options: absorb the tax and erode their finances, raise prices and risk losing volume (or the retail placement altogether), or scramble to move production out of China against the clock.
The 2018–2019 trade war showed that price effects were muted at the checkout aisle – not because tariffs had no cost, but because companies absorbed costs and restructured supply chains behind the scenes (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street) (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street). Procurement behavior became more adversarial: retailers haggled hard and some suppliers acted as sacrificial lambs (taking losses to stay in the game) (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters). Smaller brands learned the hard way that inflexible margins and retailer expectations can squeeze them to the breaking point in a tariff crisis. Expert supply chain consultants often advise diversifying sourcing before trouble strikes, precisely so that no single country shock – even one as extreme as a 100% tariff – can derail the business. But for those caught unprepared, the realistic playbook is: negotiate, cut costs, share the burden, and adapt your supply chain as fast as humanly possible. As one retail CEO succinctly put it, tariffs create “a little disturbance” that for many small suppliers can feel like a fight for survival (Small Businesses Are Running Out of Moves in Trump’s Trade War - WSJ). The keys to getting through it are collaboration (however strained) with the retailer, creative problem-solving (from pricing tweaks to new sourcing), and if feasible, a strategic pivot away from the tariff’s bullseye – so that both retailer and small brand can eventually return to more stable footing in the marketplace.
Sources:
Wolf Street – Analysis of 2018–2019 tariff impacts on prices and margins (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street) (What Trump’s Tariffs Did Last Time (2018-2019): No Impact on Inflation, Doubled Receipts from Customs Duties, and Hit Stocks | Wolf Street)
Reuters (Mar 24, 2025) – “US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs” (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters) (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters) (US retailers haggle with suppliers after Trump tariffs | Reuters)
Quartz (Apr 2, 2025) – “Walmart continues to lead on tariffs, pressuring suppliers” (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs) (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs) (Walmart further pressures suppliers absorb tariffs)
Reuters (Apr 8, 2025) – “Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit” (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters) (Clothing retailers delay orders, freeze hiring as tariffs hit | Reuters)
Reuters (Mar 12, 2025) – Walmart’s exposure and tactics on tariffs (Walmart clashes with China after asking suppliers to absorb tariffs) (Walmart clashes with China after asking suppliers to absorb tariffs)
Osborne Clarke (Apr 7, 2025) – Legal insight on tariffs and contracts (US tariffs: how will these affect commercial contracts and what can be done to mitigate any impact? | Osborne Clarke) (US tariffs: how will these affect commercial contracts and what can be done to mitigate any impact? | Osborne Clarke)
Wall Street Journal (Ruth Simon, 2025) – Impact on small businesses in trade war (Small Businesses Are Running Out of Moves in Trump’s Trade War - WSJ) (Small Businesses Are Running Out of Moves in Trump’s Trade War - WSJ)
PLS Logistics – Trade war impact on retail sourcing (Sheng Lu quote) (US-China Trade War: Impact on Shipping & Retail - PLS Logistics)